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WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHPEW
In the untimely death of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Southmayd
Professor of Law, Yale University has lost a scholar of marked dis-
tinction and the cause of legal scholarship everywhere has lost a
devoted disciple. He coupled with rare idealism for the improve-
ment of legal science an extraordinary power of analysis and an orig-
inality and independence of mind which have made his juristic thought
unique. Upon the editors of the JouRNAL his death falls as a personal
bereavement and an irreparable loss. Even before his call to the
Yale Faculty, Professor Hohfeld had contributed to our pages; and
from the moinent of his arrival in New Haven he took marked interest
in the JOURNAL and in the development and improvement of its edito-
rial work. The privilege of consultation with him has been an
inspiration to every editor who has had the fortune to know him.
Nor was he ever too busy to be consulted; and in the discussion of
legal problems his standard of scholarship and his broad knowledge
spurred and guided us to the best of our accomplishment.
Professor Hohfeld was called to the Yale Law School in 1914.
Although he was connected with Yale for only a comparatively short
time, and held his degrees in arts and in law from other universities,
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no graduate of Yale could have been more loyally devoted to the Uni-
versity. His whole heart and mind were wrapped up in the develop-
ment of this School. Even during the long weeks of his illness his
thoughts were constantly directed toward the School and his return to
its work. His constructive imagination, his large vision, the optimistic
courage with which he looked forward to improvement in legal educa-
tion and to the grailual overcoming of defects in the administration of
justice were a constant inspiration to his colleagues.
As a teacher Professor Hohfeld was stimulating to his students-
particularly to the abler ones. He set for his class and for himself a
high standard of scholarship--rigidly high. But many young law-
yers who have come under his instruction and who as students
thought his standaids too severe have subsequently written him that
the training he gave them in exact analysis and in accuracy of thought
and statement had proven of inestimable value in their practice.
Students and members of the faculty will miss his inspiration sorely.
Professor Hohfeld was a graduate of the University of California,
receiving the degree of Bachelor of Arts in ioi. The following year
he entered the Harvard Law School, being graduated with honors
in 19o4. During his law school years he was an editor of the HAR-
vAm LAw REViEW. Upon the completion of his course in law he
returned to San Francisco and engaged in the general practice of law.
After one year he began his career as a teacher of law, first as instruc-
tor of law in Hastings College of Law (University of California),
then as a member of the faculty of Leland Stanford University, where
he was rapidly promoted from instructor, to assistant professor, asso-
ciate professor and professor of law. From Stanford University he
was called to Yale. Professor Hohfeld was also connected during
certain summer sessions with the law faculties of the Universities of
California, Michigan, and Chicago.
His death was the result of endocarditis which followed a severe
attack of grippe. Since last February he had been constantly con-
fined to his bed. In the summer he returned to his sister's home in
Alameda, California, where the end came on October 21st. He was
thirty-nine years of age and was a bachelor. Both of his parents, two
brothers, and three sisters survive him.
While Professor Hohfeld was a student of many branches of the
law and possessed a memory which enabled.him to acquire a knowl-
edge unusually broad, it was in the field of analytical jurisprudence
that his deepest interest lay; and it is in this field that he has made the
greatest contribution to legal scholarship. His essay on Some Funda-
mental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning which was
published in the YALE LAw JOURxAL for November, 1913, is believed
by many to be the most important and original contribution to legal
science which has appeared in a generation. His other writings also,
all of which were published in legal periodicals, show a power of
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ialysis and an ability to deduce general principles from various and
)parently dissimilar specific instances which give them 'distinctive
lue. Their very merits-the thoroughness of his studies, the close-
!ss of his reasoning, and the exhaustiveness with which he treated
ie subjects discussed-have tended to limit the appeal of his writings
legal scholars and to prevent the average reader from becoming
ell acquainted with his work. This is a misfortune. Professor
ohfeld's writing, while dealing with fundamental concepts and the-
ties, is always directed toward practical ends. He was interested
theory only so far as it would help lawyers, judges and legislators
odevelop the law scientifically. At the time of his death he had in
reparation casebooks on Trusts, Evidence and Conflict of Laws, and
ad collected a mass of material for publication in further eluci-
ation of the principles laid down and developed in his Fundamental
'onceptions.
Below is appended a list of Professor Hohfeld's publications:
he Nature of Stockholders' Individual Liability for Corporation Debts (igo9)
9 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, 285.
he Indihidual Liability of Stockholders and the Conflict of Lats (i9o9) 9
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, 492; (IgIO) io ibid. 283; 1o ibid. 52o.
'he Relations Between Equity and Law (1913) I1 MICHIGA LAW R VEW, 537.
ome Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (193)
23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 6; (1917) 26 ibid. 710.
Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law (1914) Proceedings of Association of
American Law Schools.
he Conflict of Equity and Law (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 767.
aulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOUR-
NAL, 66.
A WITHDRAWN PLEA OF GUILTY AS EVIDENCE AT A LATER TRIAL
In the case of Heim v. United States,' the Court of Appeals of the
listrict of Columbia has recently recorded its decision that a plea of
uilty, once withdrawn, shall not be used as evidence against the
eader at a subsequent trial, no matter how limited by judicial instruc-
on. The Chief Justice dissented in a carefully reasoned opinion.
'his decision is directly and admittedly opposed to a Connecticut
ecision 2 only two years old which, by a divided court, sustained a
ial judge in admitting as evidence the defendant's withdrawn plea
f guilty to a charge of murder.
This particular question has, strangely enough, met with little dis-
.ission. Prior to the Connecticut decision above mentioned, 2 there
!em to have been remarkably few cases in which the poifit was
(xr8, D. C. App.) 46 Wash. L. Rep. 242, 5o Chi. Leg. News, 314.
2State v. Carta (z916) go Conn. 79, 96 Ad. 411.
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decided; all of these proceeded independently; no authorities were
cited; and in none was any very exhaustive reasoning indulged.
A very early Kentucky case3 permitted the withdrawn plea of
guilty to be later used against the pleader. It is possible to distinguish
that case from the present one, however, in that there the defendant
stood by his plea through an appeal before withdrawing it. Fifty
years later California swung the other way.4 This case, too, can
be distinguished from the present. A California statute granted
the defendant an absolute right to substitute one plea for another in a
civil suit, and the Court placed its decision on legislative intent: if
such absolute rights were conferred as to civil suits, a similar right
in the much more serious criminal trials must be inferred. The pre-
vious year the Supreme Court of Missouri had decided the question in
the same way5 but on a different and less tenable ground: that the
withdrawn plea, if used as evidence in a later trial, would be con-
clusive against the defendant-just as it was conclusive in its original
form as a plea-and thus the privilege of withdrawing would be made
a nullity. Such reasoning clearly differentiates the Missouri decision
from the principal case. In the latter it was conceded that the plea
could be conclusive only while it stood as a plea. When used as evi-
dence at a later trial, an" instfiuction by the judge would make clear
that it, like other evidence, was subject to explanation or refutation.,
Meanwhile the treatises had done as little to investigate the problem.
Mr. Wigmore omitted the matter entirely from his work on Evi-
dence, though he devoted considerable space to the related question,
admissibility of a withdrawn civil pleading as evidence; Mr. Cham-
berlain passes it over in a hurried footnote,8 with but one citation (the
California case) and no discusssion; and other writers are equally
lacking in any thorough examination of arguments, bare statements of
"the law" being the usual treatment.9
It may therefore be said that the Connecticut and District of Col-
umbia decisions (which range on opposite sides of the question and
of which each was decided by a majority of one) together with their
'Commonwealth v. Ervine (1839, Ky.) 8 Dana, 30.
'People v. Ryan (i8go) 82 Cal. 617, 23 Pac. 121.
'State v. Meyers (x889) 99 Mo. 107, I19-i2o. r2 S. W. S16, 519.
'This seems to be much the sounder view. The moment that what was a plea
of guilty ceases, by withdrawal, to be a plea it becomes evidence only. and it
thereby becomes open to refutation. That it is in practice hard to refute has
nothing to do with its quality in law; it has ceased legally to be conclusive.
7I Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 815; 2 ibid. sec. 1o63 ff.
:2 Chamberlain, Evidence. sec. 1243, n. 5.
'Wharton, Grim. Ev. (oth ed.) sec. 638; Abbott, Grim. Trial Brief, 314; z
Encyc. P1. & Pr. 779; 8 R. C. L. I2; r2 Cyc. 426. The Encyclopaedia of Evi-
dence seems to have omitted this matter entirely, although related questions are
discussed elaborately. See Encyc. Ev., Admissions.
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respective vigorous dissents, form at this date the only real treatise
on the subject. They are an interesting composite.
The outstanding objection to the District of Columbia view would
seem to be that it prohibits the use in evidence of a deliberate and vol-
untary confession made in court at the same time that it permits the
use of a hasty, ill-considered confession made anywhere on earth
except in the court room. The decision might be said with some show
of truth to prohibit the use of good evidence, while permitting the use
of evidence of dubious value. This is the reasoning urged in the
majority opinion in the Connecticut case and by Chief Justice Smyth's
dissent in Heim v. United States. If it is the sober fact that a pris-
oner's plea of guilty is a voluntary, deliberate, and well understood
course of action, it should be good evidence of his guilt,--though not
conclusive after withdrawal,--and the prisoner should suffer the con-
sequences. Certainly the mere fact that it may be highly damaging
evidence and hard to explain should be no reason for excluding it.
But a doubt arises as to whether in the life that men are living the
prisoner's plea is truly a voluntary, deliberate and well understood
course of action on his part. It is true that the trial judge carefully
explains to the prisoner the seriousness of the plea before he allows
it to be entered. But do not ignorant defendants-and a very consid-
erable portion of criminal trials concern ignorant defendants--depend
implicitly, after all, on the advice of counsel; and is not the judge's
cautionary explanation in truth a warning only to the defendant's
attorney? And if it be urged that even the ignorant comprehend a
confession of guilt and know enough to deny what they have not done,
may it not be asked in reply, "What stupid brain--or bright one
either-exactly realizes the difference between pleading guilty to a
charge of murder in the third degree and to one of first degree man-
slaughter?' The extrajudicial confession is at least wholly the pris-
oner's own. His pleas in court are likely to be those of his attorney.
If this be sound, it would seem to cut away much of the ground
from under the arguments made in the cases on either side of the
proposition. For if the "confession in open court" be in truth so
dubious of credibility, the objection can hardly be made to its rejection
that, as the most solemn and convincing of confessions, it should be
admitted if any confession is admitted at all; while on the other hand
the argument equally ceases to apply, that the confession should be
excluded because so damaging to the prisoner as to nullify all effect of
his change of plea.
The logical conclusion of the above discussion would be the admis-
sion in evidence of the withdrawn plea of guilty, accompanied by
instructions of the court as to its effect-not only as to its non-con-
clusiveness, but also as to the influence which advice of counsel may
fairly be supposed to have had on the entering of such a plea. Even
then, there remains a question of policy. Some sorts of evidence are
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excluded because thought more likely to prejudice than to convince.
Can a court so instruct a jury as to convey the true weight of such
technical evidence as this former plea? Is it desirable to distract
attention from the issues of the trial by beating over before the jury
the question of how far pleas and evidence represent not facts, but
wits of counsel matched in a game? Will not a jury, almost inev-
itably, according to its temper either disregard the plea altogether, or
attach to it despite instruction all that ruthless force which is here
contended not to be due it, either in law or in fact? The decision-in
Heim v. United States seems after all the right one.
WHAT CONSTITUTES AN "INJURY" TO "'REAL PROPERTY"?
The opinion in the recent case of Johnson v. Rouchleau-Ray Iron
Land Co. (1918, Minn.) 168 N. W. i, leads one to reflect upon the
inadequate analysis in many legal opinions dealing with "injuries" to
"real property." In that case it was found by the jury that acts of
the def.ndant had created on its own land a dangerous condition which
threatened to result at any moment in a physical invasion of the plain-
tiff's land, and that as a consequence the market value of that land had
been substantially diminished In holding that the plaintiff was not
entitled to damages the court said: "He rests his claim for damages
squarely upon fear or apprehension that because one slide has occurred
another is likely to happen at any time which might strike his property,
and that as the result of such apprehension the market value of his
property has been greatly diminished. Respondent's [plaintiff's] con-
tention cannot be sustained. To recover damages for injury to real
property, resulting from negligence, the owner must wait until the
injury or damage has actually happened. It is the damage, and not
the anticipation thereof, that gives rise to the cause of action."2 With-
out, for the moment, questioning the soundness of the result reached,
.one may raise a doubt as to the adequacy of the reasons given. It is
apparently assumed by the court that "injury" or "damage" to
"real property" must always consist of some kind of physical inter-
ference with the "property." It must be confessed that many corn-.
mon law cases give countenance to this assumption. All reasoning of
this kind fails to take notice of an ambiguity in the word "property,"
with the result that legal and non-legal conceptions'are hopelessly con-
fused and erroneous- results sometimes reached. At times the word is
used to denote the physical object to which'various legal3 rights, etc.,
relate; at other times it signifies the aggregate of legal rights, privi-
1For full statement of facts, see REcEmN CAsE NOTES, infra.
'The italics are those of the present writer.
"'Legal" is here used as including both common law and equitable jural
relations.
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leges, powers and immunities which together constitute a particular
complex legal interest "in the property."
'  There can of course be no
"injury" tb the physical object-the "property" in that sense-until
there is an actual invasion of it by material particles. This does not
of itself tell us whether acts whose results fall short of a physical
interference with the material "property" in question are or are not
legal wrongs. It is still possible that "ownership
' 5 of the physical
"property" may include rights not to have the sale value or perhaps
the rental value of the "property" depreciated by acts of the kind
involved in the case before us.
The consideration of a concrete case will perhaps illustrate what is
meant. Suppose in the case in hand the "property" had been in pos-
session of a tenant of the plaintiff; that this tenant had. refused to
renew his lease because of the threatening condition on the defendant's
land; that as a further consequence the plaintiff had been unable 
to
obtain other tenants and so had lost for a time an amount equal to the
rental value of the "property." In such a case it is, a priori, conceiv-
able that a just system of law would require one who had negligently
produced this result to compensate the plaintiff. If so, in a system
of law of that kind the "owner" of property would as a part of his
"ownership" have legal rights against others that they refrain from
causing loss to him in the manner stated. Whether under our system
of law an owner has rights of this kind is another question and one
which will be discussed in a moment. The point now made is, 
that
by directing their attention too much to the mere physical "property"
the courts miss the real point at issue, viz., whether one who does
things of the kind in question does not "legally injure"-i. e. violate a
legal right of-the owner of the "property" whose value has 
been
thus affected.
Even if we should conclude that an owner of property as such has
not rights of the kind suggested, there is another possibility to be 
dis-
cussed, viz., that acts which produce results of the kind under discus-
sion violate rights which each one of us has simply as a human being,
rights which can perhaps best be generally described as "rights to
undiminished financial condition." By this general phrase is meant
rights that others shall not intentionally or negligently cause financial
loss, except under certain privileged circumstances.
One or two concrete examples from our existing body of law will
perhaps make more clear the foregoing somewhat abstract discussion.
(i) In our law of torts we find a wrong called "Slander of Title."
' f. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning (1913) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 16, 21.
'"Ownership" as here used is merely a symbol for the complex legal 
interest,
i. e., the aggregate of jural relations (rights, privileges, powers and immunities)
vested in the one who is said to "own" the physical "property."
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This species of tort is broader than its name would indicate and covers
"the publication of false statements, disparaging the title or property
interests of the plaintiff, with the intention of causing him damage
and resulting in actual damage to him."61 Here is no physical invasion
of the tangible "property" (physical object owned). Shall we
regard this as a violation of property rights which with other rights,
privileges, etc., constitute the plaintiff's ownership? So far as the
cases go, we may, and the name given to the wrong-Slander of
Title-suggests this. On the other hand, it is at least plausible to
argue that it falls under the second class of rights mentioned-those
to "undiminished financial condition" except upon privileged occa-
sions. For example, an action lies for damage due to false statements
that the plaintiff has gone out of business.
1  This can hardly be
thought of as an invasion of the rights of an owner of property as
such. (2) The equitable doctrine which permits relief .against cloud
on title is another illustration of the existence as part of the owner-
ship of property of rights other than rights to be free from physical
injury to the tangible object owned. Of course here one obtains
specific relief rather than damages, but that does not affect the prin-
ciple in question.
It will hardly do, then, to dismiss the plaintiff in the principal case in
the summary fashion in which the court did. However, it must be
admitted that there are cases in the reports which seem to accept as a
principle of decision that enunciated in the opinion of the court. A
striking example is found in a case in New York," in which the defend-
ant operated its electric lighting plant in a manner which as against
tenants of neighboring premises constituted a nuisance.' In conse-
quence the plaintiff, who owned adjacent property which was leased to
tenants, was obliged when the leases ran out to accept a reduced rental,
thereby-according to the finding of facts by the tiial court-losing in
a five year period several thousand dollars.
1 0 In spite of this the
court-Gray, Bartlett and Haight, J. J., dissenting in a vigorous
opinion-denied a recovery, even though the defendant maintained the
nuisance for the whole of the five-year period. A result of this kind
shocks one's sense of justice and seems at first sight inexplicable. It
will be found on examination to be due, at least in part, to the
"Burdick, Torts (3d ed.) 435.
TRadcliffe v. Evans (x892) 2 Q. B. 524, 61 L. J. Q. B. 535.
' Miller v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co. (i9o5) 184 N. Y. 17, 76 N. E. 734.
The decision in the earlier case of Francis v. Schoellkopf (1873) 53 N. Y. 152
seems to be in conflict with the Miller case.
'Bly v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co. (1902) 172 N. Y. 1, 64 N. E. 745.
"The trial court found that the alleged loss of $3ooo per year for five years,
or a total loss of $15,ooo, was as to a substantial part due to the existence of the
nuisance on the defendant's premises.
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ambiguity in legal terminology already discussed. After quoting from
Sir George Jessel to the effect that "to entitle a reversioner to main-
tain an action, the injury must be of a permanentcharacter"11 the court
said: "Here the only injury found by the trial court is to the enjoy-
ment and occupation of the premises. That does not affect the rever-
sioner."1 2 Here is the nub of the difficulty-obviously the court has in
mind merely physical injuries to the tangible object. The argument
seems to be: "a nuisance must involve a physical invasion of the
owner's physical 'property'; no physical invasion existed here; there-
fore the defendant has committed no legal wrong." Even if we
grant that so far as the law of nuisance is concerned, the acts of the
defendants did not result in a nuisance to the plaintiff, we still have to
face the problem: were the defendants not guilty of some other kind
of legal wrong? As well might one argue in an action for "slander
of title" that since there is no "permanent injury" to the physical
"property" a reversioner cannot recover for his financial loss due to
the slander of his title.
Many other cases might be cited which exhibit the same superficial
line of reasoning, but space is wanting in which even to cite them."'
In some a correct result is without doubt reached, but by means of a
merely superficial discussion of the kind indicated. In the case which
is the subject of this note the court was probably correct in refusing
to allow the owner to recover the present diminution in the market
value of his land, for tomorrow the defendant may abate the threaten-
ing condition on his land and the market value of the plaintiff's land
would then again rise. On the other hand, it would seem that the
plaintiff ought to be entitled to a mandatory injunction for the abate-
ment of the threatening condition.14 As incidental thereto he clearly
ought to recover whatever actual financial loss he has suffered because
of the defendant's acts. A discussion of the exact method of comput-
ing these damages is not within the scope of the present note, the chief
purpose of which is to point out the lack of clear analysis in many
current discussions of the topic under consideration.
W. W. C.
"Opinion in Mott v. Shoolbred (187z) L. R. 2o Eq. Cas. =. The italics in
this and following quotations are those of thh present writer.
' The New York court was influenced to reach its decision because it had
previously held, in the case cited in note 9, supra, that the tenant who took a
lease during the existence of the nuisance could recover damages for the same.
Apparently the court thought that both tenant and landlord ought not to
recover; but surely the tenant ought not to have damages for the wrong of
which the landlord complained in the Miller case.
Conspicuous examples are: Simpson v. Savage (1856) 1 C. B. N. S. 343;
West Leigh Colliery Co., Ltd. v. Tunnicliffe & Hampson, Ltd. [i9o8] A. C. 27.
"Cases like Mott v. Shoolbred, cited in note xx, supra, make even this
doubtful.
"'Cf. the suggestions as to the measure of damages (if a recovery were
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CONVERSION BY INNOCENT AGENTS
.He who would attempt to define adequately in a few words the tort
known to our law as a conversion would indeed be a bold man.'
Probably no definition can be framed unless expressed in such general
terms as to be of little use except to one who already knows the
authorities. Be this as it may, a recent case serves to emphasize some
of the difficulties of the subject. A possessor of negotiable instru-
ments payable to bearer, which had been stolen from the plaintiff,
delivered them to the defendants, who were bankers, and authorized
their sale. The defendants sold them and paid over the proceeds to
their principal-all without notice of the plaintiff's interest. It was
held that the defendants' acts did not constitute a conversion. Pratt
v. Higginson (1918, Mass.) ii9 N. E. 662.2
In making its decision the Massachusetts court followed an earlier
case in the same jurisdictions and apparently was not aware that
an opposite conclusion had been reached in at least one other state.'
As cases upon the precise point involved are few in number and con-
flicting, it seems that the problem is in most jurisdictions an open one.
Cases dealing with ordinary "tangible personal property"
5 are of
course common enough. The view prevailing in most American
jurisdictions undoubtedly is that "a person is guilty of a conversion
who sells the property of another, without authority from the owner,
notwithstanding he acts under the authority of one claiming to be the
owner, and is ignorant of such person's want of title."8  In England
the question apparently has not been settled by the court of final
authority,7 but a decision of the Queen's Bench Division accords with
allowed) in the note to the case of Miller v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co.
in 3 L. RL A. (N. S.) xo6i. Massachusetts has an interesting statute dealing
with the subject A construction of this statute will be found.in Smith v. Morse
(.88g) x48 Mass. 4o7, ig N. E. 393.
" "I am never very confident as to what is or is not a conversion." Bramwell,
L. J., in National Mercantile Bank v. Rymill (1881) 44 L T. (N. S.) 767.
2For complete statement of facts, see REcENT CAs E Notms, infra.
'Spooner v. Holmes (i869) xom Mass. 5o3. In that case the defendant derived
no profit from the sale; in the principal case the defendants were paid a com-
mission. The court very properly refused to distinguish the cases on that
ground.
"Kimball v. Billings (1867) 55 Me. 147.
'The word "property" here refers, of course, to the physical object owned.
A discussion of the ambiguous use of this word will be found in the preceding
Comment: What is an "Injury" to "Real Property"t
"Quoted from the opinion of the court in Kimball v. Billings, cited supra, note
4. For citation of cases taking the prevailing view, see the note in 50 L R. A.
(N. S.) 52.
'Hollins v. Fowler (1875) L. R. 7 H. L. 757, naturally comes to mind, but
that case does not settle the question, for there the defendants-according to
the findings of fact-purchased the goods as principals and then re-sold them.
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the prevailing American view." However, a decision of the Court of
Appeal in an earlier case9 seems hard to reconcile in principle with
that view, and we may agree with the learned editor of the LAW
QUARTERLY REviEw that with the English authorities as they were
some other judge of the Queen's Bench Division might have decided
the Consolidated Bank case the other way.1 0 In fact there are a few-
very few, be it confessed-American cases which hold that the inno-
cent agent 11 is not guilty of a conversion, even where the property
sold is tangible personalty.12 The question ultimately comes down to
one of public policy, and there is much to be said in favor of the view
taken by the minority. We may well agree. with the editor of the
LAW QUARTERLY RmEVEW when in the note already quoted from he
says: "It is submitted that in cases like the Consolidated Company v.
Curtis reasons of public policy favour the auctioneer [the innocent
agent] rather than the money lender [the true owner]."
Even if we admit that the view of the- majority represents sound
policy in the case of ordinary chattels, it will not do to hastily assume,
as did the court in Maine in the case already cited,13 that the same rule
ought to apply to negotiable instruments payable to bearer. It is inter-
esting to note that neither the Maine nor the Massachusetts court gave
any adequate reason for its decision. As stated, the former merely
applied without discussion the rule settled for ordinary chattels and
did not notice the possibility of a difference. The latter, while it
recognized the distinction, contented itself with saying that the case
before it differed from that of ordinary chattels in that "title passed
by delivery of the instruments" to the holder in due course. The fact
that the purchaser is protected does not, of course, of itself, settle
whether the innocent agent is also protected. Perhaps the same con-
siderations of public policy which lead us to give protection to the
holder in due course who buys from the thief negotiable paper payable
'Consolidated Company v. Curt i & Son [1892] 1 Q. B. 495.
'National Bank v. Rymill (ig8i, C. A.) 44 L. T. (N. S.) 767. This important
case is apparently not eisewhere'reported. It seems clearly opposed in its views
of what constitutes a conversion to the earlier case of Stephens v. Elwall (1815
K. B.) 4 M. & S. 259, but doubtless is distinguishable from Consolidated Com-
pany v. Curtis & Son, cited in the preceding note.
(i892) 8 L. QuART. REv. 134 and 183.
The term "innocent agent" has been used in this Comment to denote an
agent who sells chattels or negotiable paper entrusted to him by a principal with-
out notice, actual or constructive, of the claims of the true-owner.
'A. I. Roach & Co. v. Turk and Hawkins (1872, Tenn.) 9 Heisk. 704; . T.
Fargason Co. v. Ball (913) x28 Tenn. 137, 159 S. W. 221. Apparently the Ten-
nessee court applies the rule of non-liability to innocent agents generally. In
Kentucky it is limited, apparently, to agents who are under a duty to serve the
public without discrimination. Abernathy v. Wheeler (i8go) 13 Ky. L. Rep.
713, 17 S. W. 858.
" Supra, note 3.
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to bearer, will also lead us to exempt the innocent selling agent from
liability; but that can be determined only by examining into those con-
siderations of policy-a thing which the Massachusetts court failed to
do. Note the problem: By the law governing negotiable instruments,
in order that commercial paper may perform its functions, a thief is
given a legal power but no legal privilege"4 to confer an indefeasible
ownership of the instruments upon a holder in due course. By virtue
of this power the thief can confer upon his agent-the innocent banker
of the principal case-a power to do the same. Does the innocent
agent acquire a legal privilege as well as a power? Or is he under
a duty to refrain from selling, even innocently, the instruments, so that
if he does he will be liable to the true owner in damages? The state-
ment of the Massachusetts court as to the protection given the holder
in due course clearly involves the existence of the power, but obviously
it tells us nothing as to the privilege. We may, however, conclude
that negotiable paper payable to bearer will not be dealt with as freely
as we wish it to be unless we extend protection to the innocent agent as
well as to the holder in due course; if so, we shall protect the former
as well as the latter-and this probably is what the Massachusetts
court had in mind.
If we adopt the Massachusetts view, we have the following interest-
ing-but perhaps justifiable consequences. Where the acts of the inno-
cent agent result in divesting the owner of personal property of all
claim to the property sold, there is no conversion by agent or
purchaser, and the former owner is left with an action against one
person only, viz., the dishonest principal; where, as in the case of
ordinary chattels, the innocent agent's acts leave the person whose
property has been misappropriated with full title to his property,
there is a conversion by the agent and the owner has his option to
proceed against either: (i) the misappropriating principal; or (2)
the innocent agent; or indeed (3) the purchaser. It may also be
noted that the latter rule would apply to a promissory note which is not
negotiable,' 5 as well as to other'non-negotiable instruments.' Appar-
ently the former rule would apply to the sale by an innocent agent of
t Power and privilege are here used in a technical sense, the former to signify
that the person concerned by his acts can accomplish certain results; the latter
to denote bsence of duty on the part of the privileged pirson to refrain from
accomplishing those results. Not being privileged to transfer title the thief is
liable to the true owner if he exercises his power to do so.
'For example, to a purported sale and transfer by an innocent agent of a
written promise to pay to bearer, which contains conditions so that the instru-
ment is not negotiable.
1
'Bercich v. Marye (1874) 9 Nev. 312, in which a broker who innocently, as
agent, sold stolen non-negotiable certificates of stock was held liable to the
owner for conversion, although the latter had indorsed them in blank before
the theft occurred. Cf. Koch v. Brahch (1869) 44 Mo. 542.
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an ordinary chattel under such circumstances that title passed to a
bona fide purchaser for value.17
One .cannot help believing that a reconsideration of the policy
involved in this whole line of cases ought to be undertaken. When
we recall the relatively slight protection given to ownership of chattels
in some of the continental systems-title may in many cases be passed
by one in possession without other titles--ought we not at least to ask
ourselves whether we need to give owners of chattels actions not only
against the misappropriating principal and the bona fide purchaser but
also against an innocent agent? The latter assumes nb dominion over
the property for himself and often derives no profit. If one sym-
pathizes with the view that the prevailing, rule as to the innocent
agent's liability in the case of ordinary chattels is of doubtful public
policy, he will welcome the decision in the principal case as a refusal
to extend the prevailing American doctrine beyond its present limits.
In the somewhat analagous case of an 'innocent agent selling trust
property for a trustee who is selling in breach of trust the law seems
to be that the agent is not liable to the cestui.19
W. W. C.
RESCISSION FOR INNOCENT MISREPRESENTATION
In the Comment bearing the above title in a previous number of
the JouRNAL1 it was pointed out that American courts were developing
the law relating to innocent misrepresentation along lines differing
somewhat from those established in the English cases. This is empha-
"For example, a sale in market overt; or by the agent of a factor under some
of the statutes giving factors entrusted with the possession of goods for sale a
power to invest a bona fide purchaser for value with full title. The question
might also arise where the agent transfers or attempts to transfer by means of a
warehouse receipt, never dealing with the physical goods. In some cases title
might pass; in others not. Would the liability of the agent to.pay damages
depend upon that? Here must be noted the suggestion that the innocent selling
agent is never liable for conversion where he deals not with the physical goods
but merely with warehouse receipts or the like. See Leuthold v Fairchild (1886)
35 Minn. 99, 27 N. W. 5o3, 28 N. W. 218.
"' French Civil Code, sec. 228o; German Civil Code, sees.- 929-936; Schuster,
Principles of the German Civil Law, 39o-399.
- 1, See Brinsden v. Williams [1894] 3 Ch. x85; Godefroi, Trusts (4th ed.)
23o. Of course there are differences between a thief of negotiable paper pay-
able to bearer and a rascally trustee, but each possesses a power, recognized as
valid by both equity and law, to defeat the claim of the owner or cestui,
respectively, by a transfer to a bona fide purchaser for value. Each is under a
duty in equity-the thief's duty is legal as well-to refrain from exercising that
power. 'We may well ask, therefore, whether agents who act in good faith
ought to be held to incur different liabilities in the two cases.
1 (1918) 27 YAL LAw JouNAL, 929.
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sized by a recent decision.in Massachusetts, holding that an innocent
misrepresentation of fact which induces a person to enter into a
bilateral agreement for the purchase of corporate stocks and bonds,
may be set up by the misrepresentee 2 as a common law defense to an
action brought by the misrepresentor for damages for breach of
contract.8 Bates v. Cashnan (1918, Mass.) 1i9 N. E. 664.
In making its decision the Massachusetts court seems unaware of
the fact that decisions settling the precise question raised are exceed-
ingly scarce, not merely in its own jurisdiction but elsewhere. The
court relied entirely upon Massachusetts cases, none of which are
squarely in point, all being in fact tort actions for deceit. The leading
English case-one which has apparently never been overruled-held
that an innocent misrepresentation is not of itself a defense to an
action at law, but with a dictum that it may be such if it leads to
"error in substantialibus."' It is possible-one can hardly say prob-
able-that an English court would to-day decide otherwise, now that
the same judges administer both law and equity. Seemingly the ques-
tion has not arisen since the Judicature Acts were passed.5 However
this may be, reference to the cases discussed in the Comment cited
above will show that the decision in the principal case is to be wel-
comed as in accord with both fairness and the general trend of Amer-
ican legal development upon the subject of misrepresentation. Such
a result was certainly to be expected in Massachusetts, where, as the
cases cited in the opinion in the principal case show, the court has
gone far toward permitting tort actions for deceit to be based upon
innocent misrepresentations.
Even if it be thought by many that sound policy does not justify
holding an innocent misrepresentor liable in tort for losses incurred
by the misrepresentee in reliance upon the misrepresentation, neverthe-
less it seems clear that one ought not, as a general rule, to be entitled
to recover damages for the breach of a bargain which he obtained by
means of a misrepresentation, whether the latter was made fraudu-
lently or innocently. If the representation be fraudulent, it ought
always to entitle the misrepresentee to refuse to carry out the bargain.
If, on the other hand, it be innocent, it seems that while as a rule it
'Misrepresentor and misrepresentee, while not in common use, are convenient
words which need no explanation. They are used in Bower, Actionable Mis-
representation, which is the best English treatise upon the subject.
For complete statement of facts, see .RcEN CAsn NoTEs, infra.
Kennedy v. Panama, etc., Mail Co. (1867) L. R. 2 Q. B. 58o.
•See Bower, ;op. cit., 231.
'Throughout the discussion it is assumed thit the misrepresentation is of a
kind such that if it were fraudulently made there would be no doubt of its
constituting a defense at law. Into the distinctions-real or supposed-between
misrepresentations of fact and law, or of -fact and opinion, the present Comment
does not enter.
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ought to constitute a defense, there are certain situations which should,
perhaps, be distinguished. It is well settled, in the jurisdictions which
grant specific performance to vendors, that a vendor who has inno-
cently misrepresented the subject-matter of a contract to sell may still
have specific performance in some cases, viz., those in which, if the
agreement is carried out, the thing received by the misrepresentee will
differ from that bargained for only in an unessential way for which
adequate compensation can be made by a corresponding abatement in
price.' In jurisdictions where this is the law, it would seem that for
a law court to hold that an innocent misrepresentation is a defense
under all circumstances would result in common law giving the mis-
representation greater effect than it has in equity. Ought not courts
of law in such jurisdictions to hold that while the innocent misrepre-
sentation is usually a defense to an action for breach of contract, it
will not be so if the situation is such that the misrepresentee, if com-
pelled specifically to perform, would receive something differing from
that bargained for only in an unessential way? If so, of course the law
court would, consistently with the rule in equity, provide for a cor-
responding reduction in the amount of damages awarded to the mis-
representor. It would seem, moreover, that a similar rule ought to
be adopted by law courts even in jurisdictions which deny specific
performance to vendors, for it is difficult to see the justice of refusing
the benefit of the bargain to an innocent misrepresentor when the
other party will, if he performs, receive substantially the thing
bargained for at a reduction in price corresponding to the deficiency.
8
If it be urged that this is to introduce "equitable" considerations into
law courts, it may be said in reply that the idea that innocent mis-
representations are of legal importance originated in equity, and
that if law courts are to attach legal consequences to them it ought
to be done only after considering what justice and fairness require.
In the principal case the facts seem to show that the misrepresenta-
tion was of such a character that the misrepresentee would if held to
the bargain not get substantially what he bargained for, or, at least, that
even if he did, it wvuld be difficult to determine an abatement in the
purchase price which would be fair to both 'parties. In either event,
therefore, the decision is not in conflict with the rule above suggested.
The court, however, did not decide the case upon these considerations
but upon the ground that an innocent misrepresentation of a material-
7 Cf. (i918) 27 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 931, note 14.
This would be accomplished-if the vendee accepted the article-by permitting
him to recoup for the deficiency when sued- for the purchase- price. If the
agreement were to pay cash at the time of delivery of the article sold, there
would of course be the difficulty that, assuming the law does not require payment
of the full purchase price, the parties may not be able to agree as to what




fact9 is always, if the misrepresentee choses to assert it, a defense to
to an action for breach of contract.
In the opinion in the principal case the court said that the defendant
was "entitled to rescind" the "contract which he has been induced to
enter into in reliance upon false though innocent misrepresentations."
Where, as in the case before the court, the agreement is purely execu-
tory upon both sides, this statement seems hardly accurate, in so far
as it suggests that the misrepresentee is already under a contractual
duty. The misrepresentee need do nothing before or after suit is
brought to "rescind" the "contract"; all he has to do is to plead the
misrepresentation as a defense.'0 It is therefore somewhat difficult to
see how he can be regarded as under an existing duty. To be sure,
he has by virtue of the transaction in question acquired a privilege and
a power to "ratify" or "affirm," i. e., by manifesting his intention to
hold the other party to the bargain, he may and can create a duty on
his own part and thereby invest the misrepresentor with a correlative
right. This privilege and power are not subject to destruction by the
misrepresentor-in technical language, are protected by an imninity.
On the other hand, it seems accurate to say that the misrepresentor by
entering into the agreement has subjected himself to a contractual duty,
which, however, will cease to exist if the misrepresentee terminates it
in any of the recognized modes. An agreement of the kind in question
does therefore create a complex aggregate of legal relations, although
one differing 'onsiderably in detail from those which would have
resulted if there had been no misrepresentation. It is consequently
perfectly accurate to speak of "rescission" even where the agreement
induced by misrepresentation is purely executory on both sides, pro-
vided we mean by that term merely putting an end to an existing
complex aggregate of legal relations."
-W. Wv. C.
THE HEIR'S COMPULSORY PORTION AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
Except for occasional homestead provisions, the -unrestricted freedom
to dispose of property by will exists in the United States, Great Britain,
Canada, and in some of the South American states. In the other
countries the power of the testator in this regard is restricted in the
9 No attempt has been made to define "material fact"; it is assumed that the
learned reader is already familiar with the meaning of that phrase in the law
of misrepresentation.
" Thurston v. Blanchard (1839, Mass.) 2 Pick. I8.
' If the agreement is not purely executory on both sides, but has been partially
or wholly performed, we shall of course find the legal relations resulting to be
different in many respects from those attaching to the executory agreement.
Cf. (I918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 929, note x.
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interest of the members of his immediate family. The portion of his
estate so withdrawn from free testamentary disposition is commonly
known as the heir's compulsory or legal portion.' There are wide dif-
ferences with respect to the persons who are entitled to a compulsory
portion, with respect to the amount to which they are entitled, and the
conditions under which they can claim their share in the estate.
2 These
differences in the law of the various countries are a fruitful source of
litigation from the standpoint of the conflict of laws.
The Civil Court of Nice was recently called upon to decide the rights
of an Italian subject in property left in France by his wife, who had
willed all of her property to her mother. The husband claimed a life
estate in one-third of the wife's property in accordance with the Italian
law governing the compulsory portion of husband and wife. As the
question was raised before a French court the judge was bound in the
first place to consult the French rules of the conflict of laws. In con-
sulting these rules the judge would find that different groups of the
operative facts, which collectively confer power upon the testator to
make a valid testamentary disposition, are controlled by different rules.
One group, which -concern the testator's personal qualities and are
commonly designated by the term "capacity," he would find controlled
by the lex patriae,4 the law of the. country to which the decedent
belonged by nationality. Another group, relating to the form in which
0
Sometimes, for example in Spain, the estate is divided into three parts. One
part is left to the free disposition of the testator. Another part is withdrawn
from his control altogether. The third part may be disposed of by will, but
must be applied as a "betterment" to his legitimate children and descendants.
Art. 8o8, Civil Code.
'Compare France, Arts. 913 ff., Civil Code; Germany, Arts. 23o3, Civil Code;
Italy, Arts. 805, 8o7, Civil Code; Spain, Arts. 8o6-8io, Civil Code; Switzerland,
Arts. 470-474, Civil Code.
' Trib. Civ. Nice, July 9, 1917, Clunet 1917, 1792.
'App. Paris, Aug. io, I872, Clunet 1874, 128; Aug. 7, 1883, Clunet 1884, i9g;
4 Weiss, TraitM de droit international privi, 639.
Except in England and the United States, the capacity to make a will is
governed generally speaking by the testator's personal law, irrespective of the
fact whether the will disposes of movable or immovable property. The term
"personal" law means, now the law of the country of which the testator was
a subject (lex patriae), now the law of his domicil. The continental countries
have accepted, with few exceptions, the lex patriae. Germany, Art. 7, Intr. Law,
Civ. Code; Italy, Art. 6, Prel. Disp., Civ. Code. In South America the states
are divided. Brazil has adopted the law of nationality, Art. 8, Civ. Code.
Argentina has retained the law of domicil, Arts. 6, 7, Civ. Code.
The Anglo-American rule which determines the testator's capacity to dispose
of immovable property according to the law of the situs accepts the view of the
Dutch school. P. Voet, De Statutis, s. 9, c. i, n. 9; s. 4, c. 2, n. 6; s. 4, c. 3,
n. 12; J. Voet, Ad Pandectas, bk. i, tit. 4, pt. 2, n. 8. This view has not found
a permanent lodgment elsewhere, not even in Holland itself. Asser & Rivier,
Eliments de droit internationa privi, 239.
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the testator's will must be expressed, he would find to be subject to the
law of the place of execution.5 He would be told to apply these rules
without reference to the nature of the property as movable or immov-
able. He would find a third group of operative facts, having reference
to a variety of other interests, to which the "personal law" of the
decedent is applied if the property is movable, and the law of the situs,
if it is immovable.
The continental courts and writers label the third group of operative
facts as "substantive" provisions. There is disagreement among them
on the question whether the rules relating to the heir's compulsory
portion should be deemed to fall within group one or within group
three, whether they belong to "capacity" or to the "substantive" law
of succession. Usually it is said that they belong to the "law of suc-
cession," as distinguished from "capacity.-" If -it be assumed that
Italy would regard the heir's compulsory portion as relating to the
"capacity" of the testator, the question in the French c6urt would be:
Which law is to decide for this court whether the problem relates to
"capacity" or to the "substantive" law of succession? This would
be a preliminary question in the eyes of some of the continental writers,
whihh must be determined before the forum can tell which of its rules
of the conflict of laws to apply-those on capacity or those on the sub-
staritive matters of succession. Bartin T now Professor of Law at the
University of Paris, was the first to call attention to the general problem.
He advanced the "theory of qualifications," according to which a
preliminary question like the above is to be-determined with reference
to the law of the forum.
A true analysis of the question requires that the rules governing the
heir's compulsory portion be placed in a group apart from the "capac-
ity" group or the "formalities" group. All of these rules restrict the
heir's power of disposition, but they do so from different points of view
and for different purposes. Hence a difference in the rules of the
conflict of laws.,
The court of Nice assumed that the question of the heir's compulsory
'Cass. March 9, 1853, D. 1853, I, 217; App. Aix, July i1, 1881, S. 1883, 2, 249;
App. Paris, Dec. 2, i898, D. 1899, 2, 177; App. Orans, Feb. 24, 1904, 31
Clunet, 68o.
" Trib. Civ. Seine, June 14, 190o, Clunet, i9o2, 144. Surville & Arthuys, Cours
Ri~mentaire de droit international privi, 6th ed., 461; Valry, Manuel de droit
international privi, 461. Contra: 2 Vareilles-Sommi~res, La .synth~se du droit
international privi, n. 117O.
The Court of Cassation in a decision of Aug. 3o, i82o, held that the provisions
applicable to the legal reserve affected the "capacity" of the testator; but this
view has been abandoned. See H. Donnedieu de Vabres, Succession ab intesfat
en droit international priv, 7or.
'Bartin, Etudes de droit international privi, I (reprinted from Clunet, 1897,
225, 466, 720).
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portion belonged to group three. In so doing it followed the view
generally accepted in France. So far as immovables are concerned this
would lead to the application of the French law. Article 3 of the
French Civil Code provides that "immovables, even those owned by
foreigners, are governed by French law." This rule has been consis-
tently' applied to the subject-matter under consideration.8 As the
French law grants to the surviving husband or wife no compulsory
portion, the plaintiff's claim to immovables was ill-founded.
With respect to the movable property left in France the court of
Nice held that, inasmuch as the parties had only a domicil de facto
in France, the husband's right to a compulsory portion were governed
by the law of Italy, the country of the wife's origin.
9 All French
courts would hold likewise that if the decedent had acquired a "legal"
domicil in France the French law would have applied. By a "legal"
domicil, in contradistinction to i de facto domicil, is meant in France
an authorized domicil within the meaning of Article i3 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "an alien who has been authorized by decree
to-establish his domicil in France shall have the enjoyment of all civil
rights." Such a domicil constitutes a preliminary step to naturalization
and is not possessed by any foreigner who does not intend to acquire
the French nationality. A de facto domicil, on the other hand,
according to Article 102 of the French Civil Code, is the _place of a
person's "principal establishment." Its chief importance consists in
the fact that such a domicil confers jurisdiction upon the French courts
with reference to the administration of the person's property upon
death and the like."0
When a foreigner has not acquired an authorized domicil in France
the French courts are inclined to say that the law of his domicil of
origin or of his country of origin controls. They appear to mean the
national law of the decedent,11 by which they understand in the case of
an American citizen the law of the state in which he was last domiciled
before he took'up his residence in France. If the nationality of the
decedent cannot be ascertained, the law of the forum is applied.12
'Cass. Jan. 26, 1892, Clunet 1893, 489; Trib. Civ. Corbeil, Aug. 4. 1897, Clunet
1898, 568; Trib. Civ. Seine, Apr. 26, i9o7, Clunet i9O7, 1132; Trib. Civ. Toulon,
Apr. 26, 1909, Clunet i912, 55o; Trib. Civ. La ChAtre, July 5, i9io, Clunet i911,
588 and note.
*Cass. Jan. 12, i869, D. 69, I, 294; Cass. May 8, i894, D. 94, 1, 355; App.
Paris, July 9, i9o2, Chinet i9O3, i8I; Aug. i, 1905, D. x9o6, 2, i69: Dec. 23,
i9o9, Revue de droit international priv6, 1910, 454; Grenoble, July 3, 1907, Revue
de droit international priv6, i9o8, 813.
"App. Paris, March 20, i896, Clunet 1896, 402; July 9, 192, Clunet 1903, i8r.
"Cass. May 8, 1894, D. 94, I, 355; Cass. March 8, i9o9, D. i9O9, I, 305; App.
Aix, March 27, i89o, D. 91, 2, I3; App. Grenoble, July 3, 1907, Revue de droit
international priv6, i9o8, 813.
'Pau, May 14, i97, Clunet 1907, 1109.
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The rule that the national law of the decedent controls the disposi-
tion of movable property upon death and the rights of the heirs to a
compulsory portion therein is established only with respect to foreigners
who have acquired an authorized domicil in France. In the excep-
tional case where such a domicil exists the law of the "legal" domicil,
that is French law, governs.13 Where the decedent is a foreigner who
has acquired neither a legal nor a de facto domicil in France, the
courts there have as a rule no jurisdiction to, distribute his movable
property in France. The question whether the national law of the
decedent or the law of his domicil at the time of his death will govern
under these circumstances cannot therefore ordinarily arise. As
regards French subjects dying domiciled abroad the law of the de
facto domicil governs the distribution and not the national law of the
decedent."
The above rules governing the right of the heir to a compulsory
portion require a qualification in two directions. The first qualifica-
tion is due to the recognition on the part of the French courts of the
renvoi theory in the law of succession. This doctrine was first recog-
nized by the Court of Cassation in the Forgo case 5 in 1878 and was
reaffirmed by the same court in igio.16 According to the established
law, therefore, if the national law of a foreigner who has acquired only
a de facto domicil in France sanctions the lex domicilii, the reference
back to the French law will be accepted. The French courts will
distribute the personal estate of the decedent in France under these cir-
cumstances in accordance with French law. The same rule holds true
as regards immovable property which a French subject may own in
Italy. On principle the French courts would determine the rights of
the heirs to a compulsory portion in such property in accordance with
the law of the situs. However, as the Italian code provides expressly
that the national law of the decedent shall control the devolution of
his property upon death, the French courts would apply the same rule
and determine the rights of such heirs to a compulsory portion in
accordance with French law.'7
The second qualification results from the law of July 14, i819, which
provides as follows:
= Cass. May 5, i875, D. 75, I, 343; Pau, May 14, i907, Clunet I9W7, 1io9; Trib.
Civ. La Chitre, July 5, I9io, Clunet 1911, 588.
"'Cass. June 21, 1861, D. 65, I, 418; Cass. Apr. 27, 1868, D. 1868, 1, 3o2;
Trib. Civ. Seine, June 25, i88o, Clunet i881, 163; App. Pau, June 22, 1885, Clunet
1887, 479.
Cass. Feb. 22, 1882, D. 82, I, 301.
March i, igio, Clunet i9io, 888; Revue de droit international priv&, i9io,
870.
, App. Aix, July 19, x9o6, Clunet 1907, 152.
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"Where a succession is to be divided between foreign and
French co-heirs, the latter shall receive by way of preference
such a share of the property in France as shall be equivalent to
the value of the property situated abroad from which they have
been excluded, for any reason whatever, on account of some
local law or custom."
This provision in favor of French heirs modifies the ordinary rules
of the conflict of laws governing movable property upon death."'
The law of 1819 applies though the decedent is a foreigner whose
personal estate is governed in the law of succession by his national
law. The only conditions for the application of the law are that there
is property in France and that a French heir or legatee is prejudiced
by the foreign legislation. Such a prejudice may result from the fact
that one of the heirs possessed according to the foreign law a right to
a compulsory portion which the French law does not recognize or from
a testamentary disposition which is valid according to the foreign law
but not according to French law. By virtue of the above law the
French heir is given by way of preference the difference between what
he actually got and what he would have got as heir under French law
in all of the property left by the decedent."'
E. G. L.
'See Baudry-Lacantinerie & Wahl, i Successions, nos. 196 ff.
" There are three principal systems governing the devolution of property upon
death. One distinguishes between movable and immovable property (England,
United States, Austria, Belgium, France, Holland, Rumania, Sweden). Of these
Austria and Sweden distribute the movable property according to the lex patriae,
instead of the lex domicilii. The second system applies the law of the situs to
both kinds of property (Illinois, Chile). The third system, influenced by the
Roman doctrine of universal succession, regards the succession as a continua-
tion of the decedent's personalty and determines devolution of the property,
therefore, in accordance with the decedent's personal law. Some of the countries
belonging to this group apply the lex patriae (Italy, Spain); others, the lex
domiili (Norway, Argentina). In addition to the above systems there are
various mixed systems "Brazil, Germany). See in regard to Austria: Decision
of Supreme Court of Austria, Nov. 4, 1897, Clunet I9oo, 649 and note by Profes-
sor Wahl. Belgium: App. Ghent, March 14, 19o7, Revue de droit internationil
priv6, 19o9, 968. Holland: Asser & Rivier, 135. Rumania: Art. 2, Civ. Code;
Cass. Feb. 2o, 19Ol, Clunet, i9o2, 916. Sweden: Synnestvedt, Le droit inter-
national privi de la Scandinavie, 272. Illinois: Rev. Stat. ig1, ch. 39, sec. i.
Chile: Art. 16, Civ. Code. Italy: Art. 8, Civ. Code. Spain: Art. io, Civ. Code.
Norway: Synnestvedt, 269. Argentina: Art. 3317, Civ. Code. Brazil: Art. r4,
Civ. Code. Germany: Secs. 24-26, Intr. Law, Civ. Code.
